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sábado, Outubro 06, 2012

Debt workout 101 - Creditors sometimes lose money








Debt Workout 101 part- 19 :   
Creditors sometimes makes mistakes and therefore MUST sometimes lose money
The (inescapable) reality of loans losses in banking:
Expected losses, include risk premium in loan pricing, provisions

Unexpected losses, absorbed with general loan loss reserve and sufficient  bank capital

Example:  100 housing mortage loans
  • Bank A:  1,5% losses
  • Bank B:   5% l osses, tighten credit policies and procedures)
  • Bank C:   10% credit restructuring andworkout, shareholders to the rescue  to replace lost capital
  • Bank D:   20% losses, subprime, close BAD bank, taxpayers to the rescue of the depositors 
Who’s got the debt problem: 
If you owe 100…€ and can’t pay, you have a problem
If you owe 1000…€ and can’t pay, the bank has a problem

Initial debt workout strategies
  • Individual creditor cancel  credit lines, asks for repayment, increase pricing, ask for additional security, call on existing third party guarantees
  • Borrowers find new creditors, ask for restructuring
  • General debt workout
  • Borrower suspends payments, seeks bankrutpcy protection
  • General all-creditor renegotiations
  • Sharing of losses, depending on relative bargaining power 
Source:  PPP Lusofonia  - Debt Workout 101 http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.com.es/2012/09/o-absurdo-de-so-defender-o-credor.html

Case 1:  Young couple asks for 80M to buy house for 100M
Creditor overestimates creditworthiness of borrowers and house collateral value at 150M, offers 120M (Basel weight 50% )
Borrower accepts 120M, buys house for 100M, furniture, takes vacation …
Unemployment rises, house prices/collateral prices fall first to 90M then to 70M, borrower loses job, divorces, etc

In economic recession, options 
  • Borrower  to sell house for 90M, retain 30M debt (total debt 120M) to repay from other sources over 10 years (or earlier if they sell the car)
  • Borrower to sell house for 70M,  agree to repay 25M from other sources  over  20 years  and the  creditor forgive 25 M 
In economic depression, options
Ii couple both become unemployed due to colapse of housing market/construcion sector
  • Press  rich parents/uncle to take over repayment of loan for the sake of the grand-children 
  • (ex-post third  party payment guarantee or substitution of creditor)
  • Borrowers abandon the house (mail the keys to the bank), rip out the doors…
  • Bank sells gutted house for 40M, takes loss for 80M
  • Taxpayers pay: Unemployment benefits, emergency housing, higher health costs 
  • Recapitalize the banks 
Case 2.  Transport financing and the debt crisis
SOE state owned company borrowed by issuing  bond
2007 Euribor+15bp
Loss making SOE rail company issues €500M,  5-year bond Schuldschein, bullet,  without Govt guarantee, taken by int’l pension fund investors
      …xx   CRISIS xx…
2012
Local bank takes 90-day funding from ECB to make loan to rail company to repay maturing bond issue at par, though trading at deep discount

No debt relief for borrower,  external debt overhang remains
Credit exposure shifted from private investor to  official creditor

Case 3.  PPP project  PF  funded  by  EIB 
2005  funding Euribor+1%
50% by EIB with guarantee on-first-demand from prime-rated banks (AA-), including local banks
30% local bank debt, with external (unmatched) funding, at Euribor
20% equity
        …xx   CRISIS xx…
2012
Project distressed, traffic shortfall – 30%
Sovereign and  banks down-rated (BB)
Local bank funding cost rises to Euribor+3%
EIB requires cash collateralization of bank payment guarantee (local banks borrow from ECB to place on collateral with EIB)
Local banks with negative interest margins (Euribor +2%), sell (impaired) PF loans at deep discount

No debt relief from borrower
Local banks in stress, urgent recapitalization need to stem deposit run, capital flight

See more Debt Workout 101 - parts 1 to 16
http://ppplusofonia.blogspot.pt/2012/09/o-absurdo-de-so-defender-o-credor.html
Os credores também se enganam

7 comentários:

PPP Lusofonia disse...

Entre os bancos multilaterais, o BEI é provavelmente a IFI mais aversa ao risco.
Financia 50% do valor dos projectos, mas protege-se com "cinto, suspensórios, alfinetes e fita cola", na forma de guarantias de pagamento emitidas por bancos comerciais ou pelos Estados.
Isto é dar funding, de longo prazo e taxas baixa sim, mas não é dar crédito.

PPP Lusofonia disse...

O Banco Europeu de Investimentos é o maior financiador das PPP nacionais, representando mais de 40% do total.

Funding baseado em cerca de €3 mil milhões de garantias de pagamento emitidas por bancos comerciais.

Spain nationalizes bank losses disse...

Surprisingly, Spain will likely nationalize the external liabilities of the banking system (a la Ireland), instead of letting the bank creditors fend for themselves (a la Iceland). It is a real bad precedent, the worse kind of moral hazard, and it represents a real deterioration in the sovereign risk, regardless of what the FT and other creditor controlled media says. We will all regret bailing out the creditors who made all those "subprime cross-border Eurozone loans" without so much as making sure that debtor countries have sufficient pre-export trade finance, as was done in the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980's.
Severe debt crisis mismanagement, very creditor driven.

Provérbios financeiros disse...

Quem comeu a carne bem pode roer os ossos.

credit bubbles WILL burst disse...

Studies show "that domestic credit growth turns out to be the key early warning indicator of crisis in developed countries. This variable is significant for most of the specifications and is able to provide the longest warning horizon—16 quarters ahead of the materialization of the crises. "
Yes, in the decades before the Internet, the best way to forecast FX devaluations was to track trends in net domestic credit, line 32 of the IMF monthly International Financial Statistics. It's still there.
If it's so "blindingly obvious" why did all the prudential regulators, the central banks, let the credit bubble get so out of hand?
Analysis seems to be a lot easer than policy.

Basel is just a city in Switzerland disse...

Back in the pre-Cook days when Basel was just a city in Switzerland, and not a mindless banking-by-numbers" risk model promoted by (im)prudential regulators, bank analysts actually evaluated banks' risk and capital adequacy.

Perhaps, instead of going forward to Basel IV, V, or X, we should go back to Basel Zero, and let the analysts work for their money once more.

PPP Lusofonia disse...

No pity for the "poor" cross-border creditors.
If they didn't want to run risks, they should have kept their money at home, under the watchful eye of their prudential(?) regulators.

Dijsselbloem et al fail to distinguish between local retail depositors and savers and the speculative and even predatory foreign investors who "lent money hand over fist", in a veritable tsu-money that slammed small fragile economies, and now want someone to to bail them out.
The latter are part of the problem, the first are part of the solution.
Treat accordingly.